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Cowardly Lion:

Courage.
What makes a King out of a slave?
Courage.
What makes the flag on the mast to wave? Courage.
What makes the elephant charge his tusk in the misty mist or the
dusky dusk?
What makes the muskrat guard his musk? Courage.
What makes the Sphinx the 7th Wonder? Courage.
What makes the dawn come up like THUNDER?! Courage.
What makes the Hottentot so hot?
What puts the "ape" in ape-ricot?
Whatta they got that I ain't got?

Dorothy & Friends: Courage!
Cowardly Lion: You can say that again.
-

The Wizard of Oz (1939)

Introduction
Through his alter ego of Geneva Crenshaw, Derrick Bell in And We Are Not
Saved travels back in time to the 1787 Constitutional Convention in an effort to warn
the framers of the legacy of inequality they were about to enshrine in the American
(U.S.) Constitution.2 Yet, the most prized interests of the framers – the pursuit of
“happiness,” their wealth and their power – proved too tempting. The result was a
bedrock of American (U.S.) law, the Constitution, which cemented the
disempowerment of anyone not wealthy, not male, and not White. As Geneva
Crenshaw observes, the framers were politicians, just like politicians of our time, whose
ultimate interest is to preserve their personal interests. While not necessarily partisan,
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Derrick Bell, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987).
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judges of the present time are political beings with political philosophies that shape the
law in favor of inequity.
Employing the critical race theoretical frame of the price of racial remedies, this
paper uses statistical analysis to document the influence of judicial political affiliation
in the outcomes of contemporary race conscious admissions cases.3 Part I begins with
an overview of Critical Race Theory (CRT) from a historical perspective. As a chief
criticism of critical race theorists is the over-reliance on voice scholarship, the paper
advances that CRT generation next should set out to empirically test the theoretical
frames put forth by CRT founders.
Towards that end Part II presents an analysis of district and circuit court
opinions at the level of individual judges prior to the Supreme Court’s rulings in Gratz
and Grutter v. Bollinger. The statistical analyses employed support the conclusion that
the outcomes of these cases rest on the political affiliations of the judges, confirming
the terse Critical Legal Studies (CLS) critique that “its all political”.
Going beyond the CLS critique and centering my work in critical race theory, in
Part III I ground my findings in Derrick Bell’s price of racial remedies framework.
What is most interesting here is that in the aggregate, the rule of judges in the arena of
race conscious admissions run contrary to the Hamiltonian ideal of the courts as
protectors of “minority” rights. While this finding is truer with respect to Republican
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The cases grouped under the umbrella term of race conscious admissions are those voluntary
desegregation cases in the K-12 context and affirmative action in admissions cases adjudicated from the
mid-1990s to 2003, when the Supreme Court rendered its decisions in Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F.Supp. 2d
811 (MI 2000), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1044 (2002), decided, 539 U.S. 244 and Grutter v. Bollinger, 137
F.Supp. 2d 821 (MI 2001), 288 F.3d 732 (6th Circ. 2002), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1043 (2002), decided,
539 U.S. 306.
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judicial appointees, the support of “minority” rights by Democratic-appointees is
noticeably less intense than Republican-support of majoritarian interests. This stands to
reason as the hope of the continuation of affirmative action policies rest with the
courage of cowardly lions: judges wedded to liberal formalistic inquiry, adjudicating a
part from past, present, and future realities. Within the price of racial remedies
framework Bell argues that Whites, even liberals, are not willing to surrender privilege
and property interests without a trade a points that are pareto optimal for Whites.
While the perception of affirmative action in admissions is that it is a zero sum
game, affirmative action as supported by the goals of educational institutions to reap
the educational benefits of diversity actually presents a point at which interests
converge. Students of color gain access to elite institutions while the institution uses
them to spark the creativity and critical thinking skills of their White counterparts. In
this vein the Supreme Court was willing to uphold the interests of the University of
Michigan to create a diverse class. Part IV concludes with the neatly contained
Hollywood-styled aspiration of Justice O’Connor in Grutter v. Bollinger. Twenty-five
years will come and the groundwork has been laid for cowardice to prevail to the
detriment of equity.

Part I – Towards a New Era in Critical Race Theory
A. CRT Beginnings
The change of the Supreme Court from the era of the Warren Court to the era of
the Burger Court marks a significant change in the history of American law, especially
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with respect to civil rights. It may have been the case that the Warren Court heard
more “easy,” cases where direct evidence of discrimination by governmental actors
were traceable to their de jure sources. It may have been the case that the Warren
Court dealt with more egregious cases of discrimination, such that one’s moral senses
as an American were incensed. Or it may have been the case that the Warren Court
held the ear and greater sympathy for people of color and “minority” rights.4 Whatever
the reason, the tide on the Court was changing and in the midst of this change was a
young civil rights activist attorney turned father of critical race theory Derrick Bell.
Bell began is legal work with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in 1960, in the
wake of civil rights victories in Brown v. Board of Education (1954)5 and Cooper v.
Aaron (1958).6 However, by the time he became the first tenured African American
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See HAROLD J. SPAETH AND JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL:
ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999) (documenting Court support for civil
rights in the Warren, Burger, and Rhenquist Courts, finding significant progression towards conservatism
beginning in the Burger Court); and Francine Sanders Romero, The Supreme Court and the Protection of
Minority Rights: An Empirical Examination of Racial Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW AND SOC’Y REV.
291 (2000) (presenting data that while the rationales for why more liberally composed Courts were better
able to support minority rights cannot be disentangled, that there is a significant difference in the
upholding of minority rights between liberal and conservative compositions of the Supreme Court).
5

347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I).
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358 U.S. 1 (1958). Cooper v. Aaron is significant as it is the Warren Court’s first
pronouncement against massive resistance to the Court’s initial decision in Brown I. Note, however, that
resistance by public officials in the South, such as the Governor and Legislature of Arkansas brought to
Court in Cooper, was encouraged by the Court’s decision in Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955)(employing a
framework of “all deliberate speed” which permitted delay in remedying discrimination). For more on
massive resistance see Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REV. 3 (1970)
and James T. Patterson, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS
TROUBLED LEGACY (2001). Cf. J. Harvie Wilkinson, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE 68 (1979) (arguing that at
the time of Brown I it was unclear whether the federal executive and legislative branches would
enforcement, as such there is no clear causal link between Brown II and massive resistance).
Note that this is generally a positive time in civil rights history. During Bell’s time at the Legal
Defense Fund from 1960 to 1965, the Warren Court’s 1963 decisions of Goss v. Board of Education, 373
U.S. 683 and Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 and its decision in Griffin v. County School Board, 377
U.S. 218 (1964) seemed to harken the end of massive resistance to desegregation in education and public
facilities. Similarly on the legislative front the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of

5

law professor at Harvard in 1971, Martin Luther King was dead (1968), White
populism grew and White liberal support for the quest of equality waned, trembling in
fear of the wrath of Black nationalism.7
From the ivory tower, Bell, along with other legal scholars of color, noted a turn
in civil rights trends coinciding with President Nixson’s appointment of Warren E.
Burger to the position of Chief Justice. According the historico-legal work of Bernie
Jones, Bell and other saw “the Supreme Court was no longer an articulate voice in
favor of civil rights and liberties; instead, it became a threat, for the justices seemed
able to limit precedents or do away with them altogether”.8 From this vantage, Bell
began to see Brown I in a new light, a failure as the formalistic grounds upon which the
Legal Defense Fund based its successful argumentation of Brown was now Brown’s
undoing. The prize in desegregation strategies was not just to have Black children sit
next to White children in school. The prize was equal opportunity and equitable
resources for all in education, work, civic participation, and leisure.9
Towards the gaining of the true prize, Bell began his work towards the training
of a new generation of lawyer activists. As a practitioner-scholar, Bell was influential

1965 codified the Court’s work to allow systematic enforcement of civil rights for all people. More
personally, after his tenure with the Legal Defense Fund Bell joined the administration, working as the
deputy director of civil rights in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. From all angles it
seemed to be the case that equality of opportunity was becoming a reality for people of color. For more
on the life and work of Derrick Bell see Derrick A. Bell, Richard Delgado, and Jean Stefancic, THE
DERRICK BELL READER (2005).
7

See Bernie D. Jones, Critical Race Theory: New Strategies for Civil Rights in the New
Millenium? 18 HAR. BLACKLETTER J. 1, 1-4 (2002).
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Id. at 3.
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See William F. Tate, IV, Critical Race Theory and Education: History, Theory, and
Implications, 22 REVIEW OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION 195, 218-221 (1997).
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as a teacher and mentor to both the theory and practice of civil rights litigation. Bell’s
pedagogical and scholarly work reflects praxis, the intersection of theory and practice,
as engaged in a critique of liberal formalism. His students also engaged in this notion
of praxis, becoming leaders of protest movements at Harvard in an effort to gain legal
education capable of creating change instead of reinforcing the status quo.10 Bell’s
work with his colleagues and students coalesced into creating a set of theoretical
frameworks we now know as Critical Race Theory (CRT).

B. Central Tenets of Critical Race Theory
At its core critical race theorists acknowledge a centrality of White supremacy
and the subordination of people of color as foundational and ubiquitous in American
(U.S.) society. The intellectual precursors of Critical Race Theory began as critiques of
formalism within a more generalized movement of Critical Legal Studies (CLS).11
Going beyond the CLS critique of law and jurisprudence as emanating from politics
and chaos, these works began to identify that racism is imbedded in the fabric of
American (U.S.) law. As such law as constructed is incapable of reaching equitable
results along racial lines.
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Id.
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See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Garry Peller, and Kendall Thomas (Eds.), CRITICAL
THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, 1995. See also, Bell, Delgado, and
Stefancic, supra note 6.
RACE THEORY:
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As critics of CLS, critical race scholars are “racial realists”12 committed to the
exposure of the racialized nature of political, economic, and social structures. Critical
Race Theorists give language to the centrality of race in American (U.S.) law and
society, as well as the injustices springing there from. By drawing upon CRT,
Philosopher Charles W. Mills offers the “Racial Contract” as a vehicle for
understanding American racism. Mills suggests that
…unlike mainstream white theory, liberal and radical, the
“Racial Contract” sees that “race” and “white supremacy”
are themselves critical theoretical terms that must be
incorporated into the vocabulary of an adequate
sociopolitical theory, that society is neither just a collection
of atomic individuals nor just a structure of workers and
capitalists. On the other hand, the “Racial Contract”
demystifies race, distancing itself from the “oppositional”
biological determinisms (melanin theory, “sun people” and
“ice people”) and occasional deplorable anti-Semitism of
some recent elements of the black tradition, as the 1960s
promise of integration fails and intransigent social
structures and growing white recalcitrance are increasingly
conceptualized in naturalistic terms.13
As such, from a CRT vantage, the social contract is not racially neutral, but
imbeds White privilege and the CRT notion of “Whiteness as Property.”14 More
pragmatically, the appearance of differences in achievement and attainment across
socio-economic, political, and educational measures are systematic and endemic
reflections of tensions between expressed ideals of “the rule of law” and “equal
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Id. As the class critique proffered by CLS scholars principally concerned themselves with
wealth differentials, the founders of CRT sought a new vocabulary to articulate and name structures of
oppression in the law and society under girded by differences in race
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THE RACIAL CONTRACT, 126 (1997).
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See Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HAR. L.REV. 1707 (1993).
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protection.”15 These tensions are imbedded within the constitution and reinforced
through formalistic interpretation.16
Towards an end of achieving social equity and justice, CRT advances the
understanding of the centrality of race from a multiplicity of disciplinary and
experiential perspectives within historical contexts. 17 In this vein, CRT scholars
advance true democracy that is pluralistic, justice seeking, and embracing of equality of
opportunity in law as in fact.18
C. The Tools of Critical Race Theory, CRT’s Critique, the Response, and
Responsibility of Generation Next
Multidiscipliarity and interdisciplinarity are core components of CRT work, a
concept hardly new in law and legal scholarship. Louis Brandeis’ classic brief in Muller
v. Oregon19 drew Supreme Court acceptance of social facts as having evidentiary value
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Kimberlé Crenshaw, et. al. (Eds.), CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED

THE MOVEMENT (1995).
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Bell, supra note 2 at 50.
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Mari Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence, III., Richard Delgado, and Kimberlé W. Crenshaw
(Eds.) WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 6 (1993).
18

See, Robert L. Hayman, Jr., The Color of Tradition: Critical Race Theory and Postmodern
Constitutional Traditionalism, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57 (1995). Note that the quest towards
“equality of opportunity in law as in fact,” does not require the guarantee of lock-step equality of result
for all. It is a mere extension of the framers aspiration for equality as expressed in its highest forms, not
as carried out in their contradictory self-aggrandizing actions.
19

208 U.S. 412, 426 (1908). For more on Justice Brandeis and the “Brandeis Brief” see S.W.
Baskerville, OF LAWS AND LIMITATIONS: AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT OF LOUIS DEMBITZ BRANDEIS
(1994); A. T. Mason, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE (1946); and, M. I. Urofsky, A MIND OF ONE PIECE:
BRANDEIS AND AMERICAN REFORM (1971).
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in legal cases.20 Within legal scholarship, social science was drawn upon to support
legal arguments. Social science methods were employed in CLS work and outgrowths
of CLS such as Law and Economics. Similarly, social scientific methodologies are
accepted in CRT.21
Part of the draw towards interdisciplinarity for CRT scholars was rejection of
the necessary constraint within the methodology of formalism, as it often reinforces
status quo inequity.22 In addition to social science approaches, one of the key methods
CRT scholars developed to get out of the binds of formalism is voice scholarship. Voice
scholarship gives outlet to marginalized voices to allow the disempowered to render
their perspective on ostensibly natural and neutral occurrences in American (U.S.) life.
Voice scholarship can be defined as a method of empowerment as seen through
counterstory/ counter-narrative, the retelling of social and legal story from a racialized
view.23 The most controversial method within the voice scholarship genre involves the
creation of new characters, alter egos, to retell stories within historical context.24
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See John Monahan and Lawrence Walker, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE LAW: CASES AND
(2002).

MATERIALS
21

Richard Delgado, When a Story is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VIRGINIA L.
REV. 95 (1990).
22

See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative,
87 MICH L. Rev. 2411, 2415 (1989) (“Stories and counterstories … offer a respite from the linear,
coercive discourse that characterizes much of legal writing.”).
23

See Tate, supra note 9, 218-221 (1997).

24

For example, one of the first characters to arise out of the counter-narrative is Bell’s Geneva
Crenshaw in And We Are Not Saved (1987). Through Geneva Bell is able to retell the stories of the
Constitution and its subsequent interpretations via judicial review in a manner that exposes the tradeoffs
made in favor of the White and the privileged, to the detriment of people of color. Another character is
Rodrigo, as created and whose life’s work in chronicled by Richard Delgado.24 In these chronicles,
Rodrigo with Delgado address tunnel vision within the civil rights movement, a vision of gender equality
to the exclusion of other subdominant groupings. Through the CRT frame of structural determinism
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Voice scholarship and the use of characters in “serious” legal research drew
mainstream critique and served to fuel the belittling of critical race scholarship. In the
1980s and 1990s mainstreamers dismissed this line of work as “literature” and “personal
anecdote.”25 Contemporarily, on the scholarship of Derrick Bell Winkfield F. Twyman,
Jr. writes that
Because he taught at the premier law school in the country,
Bell’s thoughts had a disproportionate impact on the best
and the brightest black law students. Bell became more of
a fiction writer than a scholar of constitutional doctrine. He
devised more and more imaginary narratives that infused
the law with the experience of racism. He wrote about
space ships that came to take blacks away. He wrote about
imaginary civil rights lawyers, to keep it real. And the
bright ones took their lead from Bell’s troubled sojourn into
irrelevance.26
To critique the work of Bell and other CRT scholars as a “sojourn into irrelevance”
highlights the very marginalization CRT scholars seek to address through voice
scholarship.
Traditional legal discourse reifies the voice of the dominant through claims
regarding law, politics, and morality that are universalistic in tone. It reinforces and

Delgado exposes the marginalization of minorities within subdominant groups, as the structure of the
movement, the conversation dictates the results effected. With Rodrigo, Delgado offers a theory of
social change and small group dynamics to explain social reform and social movements. See Richard
Delgado, Rodrigo’s Chronicle, 101 YALE L.J., 1357 (1992) and Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Sixth
Chronicle: Intersections, Essences, and the Dilemma of Social Reform, 68 N.Y.U. L.REV. 639 (1993).
25

Tate, supra note 9 at 220. See, e.g., Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimenstion of the Agon
between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2228 (1989) (“Narrative does
not meet the threefold demands of generality, unreflexivity, and reliability that are necessary if a
prevailing order is credibly to justify itself.”).
26

The Lightness of Critical Race Theory, INTELLECTUALCONSERVATIVE.COM (2005). For the
proposition that “the bright ones” were lead astray I say let my fellow alum of University of Virginia
School of Law speak for himself.
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legitimates power inequity.27 Voice scholarship, on the other hand, counters that
universality, revealing the socially constructed nature of reality. Voice scholarship
challenges dominance through the unveiling of assumed norms, allowing for critical
reflection. According to Delgado, stories and counterstories “…invite the reader to
suspend judgment, listen for their point or message, then decide what measure of truth
they contain.”28

Moreover, by giving voice to the subdominant voice scholarship

encourages democratic dialogue allowing for all to engage in social construction.29
Voice scholarship furthermore has psychic benefits for those whose voices are
marginalized as “irrelevant.” Through the sharing of stories people of color can crossvalidate experiences and facilitate racial identity development.30
Finally, to relegate CRT discourse to mere “storytelling” is fallacious. As
defined by Richard Delgado, a key characteristic of CRT is “the borrowing of insights
from social science on race and racism.”31 As CRT critic Twyman notes, through the
proliferation of CRT scholarship there is a new generation of scholars within the field
of law who are CRT knowledgeable. CRT also has been influential across the social
science fields and there is a cadre of scholars, generation next, who are competent in

27

See, Tate supra note 9 at 219-220. See also Patricia J. Williams, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND
RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR (1991); Delgado, supra notes 21 and 22.
28

Delgado, supra note 22 at 2415.

29

Tate supra note 9 at 217-218. See also Delgado, supra note 22 at 2439.

30

Id. See Beverly Daniel Tatum, WHY ARE ALL THE BLACK KIDS SITTING TOGETHER IN THE
AND OTHER CONVERSATIONS ABOUT RACE (1997). See also Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race,
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Anti-discrimination Law, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1331 (1988).
CAFETERIA?

31

Delgado, supra note 21 at 95.
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both legal and social science methodologies. It is incumbent upon this new generation,
in order to rebuild momentum for social justice and equity, to engage in systematic
inquiry. In this manner the stories of CRT can move beyond the pall of “anecdote” to
new legitimization as quantitative and qualitative data. It is in this spirit the rest of this
article proceeds.
Part II - The Behavioral Model of Adjudication and Contemporary Race Conscious
Admissions Cases
Drawing from the fields of law and political science, there are two overarching
camps of scholars presenting models of how judges make their decisions. On the one
hand, scholars proffering the legal model of adjudication argue that judges rule on the
basis of precedent, deductively arriving at an opinion, which is either similar or
distinguishable from previously, decided cases.32 On the other hand, behavioralists
argue that law is made rather than ascertained, and that the content of made-up law is,
in fact, the product of judicial pre-dispositions. Put more succinctly by Harold Spaeth
and Jeffrey Segal, behavioralists,33 or more specifically,

32

For research and arguments in support of the legal model of adjudication see, e.g., Arthur L.
Stinchcombe, WHEN FORMALITY WORKS: AUTHORITY AND ABSTRACTION IN LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS
(2001); Richard S. Markovits, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: LEGITIMATE LEGAL ARGUMENT AND
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1998); Kent Greenwalt, Law and Objectivity (1992); and Ronald
Dworkin, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1988).
33

Note the attitudinal model is one of three behavioral models of judicial decision making.
Other models include the public opinion model, which is a variation of the attitudinal model suggesting
that judicial attitudes mirror the opinions of the general American public by a lag of 2 to 7 years (Michael
W. Link, Tracking Public Mood in the Supreme Court: Cross-time Analyses of Criminal Procedure and
Civil Rights Cases. 48 POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY 61 (1993); William Mishler and Reginald S.
Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Model, and Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-analytic
Prospective. 58 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, 169 (1996); Segal and Spaeth, supra note 4; the separation of
powers model, which focuses on the influences of the executive, legislature, as well as the composition
of courts to predict individual judicial behavior (Cornell Clayton and David A. May, A political regimes
approach to the analysis of legal decisions. POLITY, Winter, 2000 at 233; for a critique see HAROLD J.
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[a]ttitudinalists argue that because legal rules governing
decision making (e.g., precedent, plain meaning) in the
cases that come to the Court do not limit discretion;
because the justices, unlike their lower court colleagues,
may freely implement their policy preferences.34
They find that out of 2,245 Supreme Court votes and opinions, 88.1 percent align with
judicial preferences; whereas, 11.9 percent are attributable to stare decisis.35
The work of Segal and Spaeth focuses on Supreme Court decision making,
which they concede may be different from that of lower courts,36 given the Court’s
heightened prestige and general status as a terminal appointment and ability to rule
without interference from Congress, the President, and among judges, all but their
colleagues on the Supreme Court. On the other hand, lower courts are constrained, not
only by the court above them and their own precedent, but also by the defense of their
reputation, namely the fear of being reversed on appeal.37 However, these fears are
subdued in cases where:

SPAETH AND JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999); and the rational choice model, another variation of the attitudinal
model, which focuses on judicial policy goals, including the following of precedent as an aim for judicial
policy (Thomas J. Miceli and Metin M. Cosgel, Reputation and Judicial Decision-making. 23 JOURNAL
OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND ORGANIZATION 31 (1994); DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (2002)); for a doctrinal critique see N.S. Siegel, Sen and the Hart of
jurisprudence: A critique of the economic analysis of judicial behavior. 87 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
1581-1608 (1999).
34

Segal and Spaeth, supra note 4 at 111.

35

Spaeth and Segal, supra note 33.

36

See Charles A. Johnson, Law, Politics, and Judicial Decision Making: Lower Federal Court
Uses of Supreme Court Decisions. 21 LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW 325 (1987) (finding that the legal
model, marked by its adherence to precedent, accounts for more variation in lower court decisions).
37

See Miceli and Cosgel, supra note 33.
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1. the law is new, the case is without precedent, or the
applicability of past precedent is unclear;38
2. the evidence is contradictory or of equal weight on both
sides of the issue;39 and,
3. the issues presented are politically salient.40
Under these conditions, the routine of norm enforcement undertaken by most judges,
most of the time,41 is by definition supplanted by judicial policymaking. Given the
questionable legal status of race-conscious admissions policies prior to the Supreme
Court’s Michigan decisions, the novelty of social science research on the benefits of
diversity, and the political salience of affirmative action in admissions, the context of
race conscious admissions presents ripe timing for legislative judicial decision-making.

A. The Constitutional Contradiction and the Outcomes of Contemporary Race
Conscious Admissions Cases
To conduct this analysis I estimate a behavioral model of adjudication to
estimate the relative influence of judicial political affiliation, the presence of social
science research, and demographic characteristics of judges on the outcomes of
contemporary race conscious admissions cases. This analysis is conducted at the level

38

See Robert A. Carp and Ronald Stidham, THE FEDERAL COURTS (2001).

39

Id.

40

Segal and Spaeth, supra note 4.

41

Only 14-15% of federal judges can be classified as activists who regularly engage in judicial
policy making. More than half of district court judges are interpreters who mechanically apply precedent
(52%), whereas most appellate judges are pragmatic, blending interpretivist and innovationist techniques
(59%) (Carp and Stidham, supra note 38 at 160).
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of the individual judge. The divergent approaches district and circuit court judges took
in analyzing the constitutional validity of race conscious admissions policies provide a
set of seventeen cases. Four of these cases arise in the higher education context.42 The
other thirteen are from K-12 voluntary desegregation cases. Given the small number of
higher education cases, the addition of K-12 cases helps to fill out the analysis. The
general constitutional inquiry is parallel: whether diversity is a compelling
governmental interest sufficient to justify race conscious integration plans.43 The total
number of judicial opinions included in the count is 40.44

42

Note that the case of Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994) is not included in this
analysis as the context of Podberesky differs from other race conscious admissions cases in the field of
education. In particular, Podberesky arises in the context of financial aid, specifically race-specific
scholarships. While an offer of admissions and a financial aid award are tied to a students’ ability to
enroll in a particular institution, the institutional decision to permit entry to the university and give
financial aid are distinct. The presence or absence of financial aid in this context renders it more likely
that a student will attend a particular school, rather than enabling their ability to attend college at all. Cf.
Michael A. Olivas, Constitutional Criteria: The Social Science and Common Law of Admissions
Decisions in Higher Education, 68 COLORADO LAW REVIEW, 1065 (1997)(arguing that the context of
financial aid and admissions are tied, such that the financial aid consideration is part of the admissions
decision from the perspective of an applicant).
43

See Wendy Parker, Connecting the Dots: Grutter, School Desegregation, and Federalism, 45
WM AND MARY L. REV. 1691 (2004).
44

For purposes of this inquiry, the seventeen cases are subdivided to present the opinions of 47
district and circuit court judges. Seven judges are excluded from the numerical counts presented in the
table below, as they are decided on state law grounds. These cases arise in the state of Washington and
were ultimately disposed of under Initiative 200 (I-200), also known as the Washington State Civil
Rights Initiative. Implemented November 3, 1998, I-200 states that: “the state shall not discriminate
against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color,
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting”. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60 (1998). This initiative is modeled after California’s
Proposition 209. The decisions excluded fore reasons of state law include Ninth Circuit’s opinions in
Smith v. University of Washington, 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001) and
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. School Dist. No. 1, 285 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2002) and the
district court opinion in Smith, 2 F.Supp. 2d 1324 (WA 1998).
Also note that only one opinion per judge is included so as not to over-represent a particular
judge’s approach to the cases. For that reason Judge Gertner’s opinion in Boston’s Children First v. City
of Boston, 2 F.Supp. 2d 1324 (WA 1998), Judge Bryan’s opinion in Tito v. Arlington County School
Board , 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7932 (VA 1997) (unpublished opinion), and Judge Edenfield’s opinions
in Tracy v. Board of Regent, 59 F.Supp. 2d1314 (GA 1999) and Wooden v. Board of Regents, 32 F.Supp.
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If it is the case that social equity and the furtherance of the goals of diversity are
in the aggregate the desired goals of lower court judges then it should be the case that
research on the educational benefits of diversity should have a greater influence on case
outcomes. This stands to reason because while this body of literature is relatively new,
about ten years in the making, it by in large supports that there are measurable benefits
to a racially and ethnically diverse student body. If, however, the property interests of
the White and privileged were most valued, then case outcomes would conform more
along political party affiliation lines. What follows is a description of the variables and
the data analysis.

1. Description of Variables

The first variable used in this analysis is political party affiliation, as measured
by the party affiliation of the appointing President. Although executive politics and
judicial philosophy are not perfectly aligned, on average judges tend towards
philosophies aligned with their appointer.45 Note here that the argument is not that

2d 1370 (GA 1999), both involving admissions at the University of Georgia, are also excluded from the
total count.
45

Robert A. Carp and C.K. Rowland, POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS (1983); using a sample of 26,372 judges appointed between 1933 and 1977, found that 46
percent of Democratic judges rendered liberal decisions, whereas 61 percent of Republican judges ruled
conservatively. Considering the party of the appointing president, 37 percent of Republicans appointed
by Republicans vote liberally, 42 percent of Democrats appointed by Republicans and Republicans
appointed by Democrats vote liberally, and 46 percent of Democrats appointed by Democrats vote
liberally.
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judges are partisans,46 but that judges are likely to rule in a manner that support their
perceptions of their interests as articulated through affiliation with political parties.
Carp and Stidham report that with respect to affirmative action, 72 percent of
Democratic federal district judges rule in a politically liberal manner, as compared to
49 percent of Republicans.47 As such, I predict more plaintiffs’ victories in cases over
which Republican-appointees preside. I expect the converse to be true with respect to
Democratic-appointees.
As the behavioral model of judicial decision-making includes a measure of
previous decisions of a comparable nature, it was my original intention to use past Title
VII decisions by the judges in the above cases to proxy judicial predispositions in racebased cases. However, after examining the decisions of nearly one-quarter of the
judges used in this analysis, I found that nearly 90 percent of racial employment cases
end in defendant, institutional victories. For circuit courts, such a high percentage is
not unreasonable as the standard to reverse a lower court’s decision is “clearly
erroneous.” Yet, the distribution among district court judges was also skewed. This is
most likely due to administrative procedures through the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, required in employment cases, resulting in the resolution of
many suits before trial. In addition the burden of proof required for plaintiffs to

46

See Randall Lloyd, Separating Partisanship from Party in Judicial Research:
Reapportionment in the U.S. District Courts, 89 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 413 (1995).
In this study, Lloyd finds no correlation between the appointer of the judge and decisions rendered in
redistricting cases, despite the degree of political salience. This study points to judges being impartial
with regard partisan issues, but is silent with regard to political issues with ideological undertones, such
as race conscious admissions.
47

Carp and Stidham, supra note 38 at 134.
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succeed on the merits is high. Because of its unidirectional sway, the factor of previous
rulings was excluded from the present analysis. The effect of previous rulings is likely
to be captured in political affiliation as the combination of party affiliation and previous
rulings reveal a judge’s preference with respect to affirmative action.
The next variable in the equation is judge’s race. Although there are several
sociological factors related to judicial decision-making, including the judge’s religion,
socioeconomic status, and geography,48 at the forefront of the competitive admissions
issue is race and the constitutional appropriateness of the race factor in admissions
considerations. As this issue historically is framed in terms of black and white49 and
the Who’s Who biographical database flags self-identified judges of African American
heritage with the Who’s Who Among African Americans, judges are coded as either
black or white/ not indicated. Other races/ethnicities are not indicated in the Who’s
Who Biographical Database. The validity of this classification was verified through
cross-referencing the names of judges in this sample with The Directory of Minority
Judges of the United States.50 As such the risk of suppressing the effect of race for

48

Id.

49

See David A. Hollinger, Group Preference, Cultural Diversity, and Social Democracy: Notes
Toward a Theory of Affirmative Action in RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (Robert
Post and Michael Rogin eds., 1998). This is not to suggest that African American and judges rule alike
or in any other particular manner. In fact, contrary to the hypotheses of Steffensmeier and Britt,black
judges are actually tougher on crime, as evinced by higher incarceration rates, than their white
counterparts. See Darrell Steffensmeier and Chester L. Britt, Judges' Race and Judicial Decision
Making: Do Black Judges Sentence Differently? 82 SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 749 (2001). A similar
reversal of hypotheses could occur in the present study, with minority judges feeling pressured to render
more conservative opinions in order to maintain their reputations as objective jurists.
50

ABA, DIRECTORY OF MINORITY JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES (2001).
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judges who do not identify themselves as black, as well as judges who are neither black
nor white, is de minimus.
Gender is also considered a factor in one’s support for affirmative action. It too
is included in the present analysis, coded on the basis of male/ female using Who’s Who
to confirm male or female status.
Of the 40 judges deciding contemporary competitive admissions cases, 23 are
Republican appointees, 60.5 percent, as compared to 15 appointments by Democrats,
39.5 percent. In addition, three African American judges compose 7.9 percent of the
sample and five women comprise 13.2 percent.
Does this set of judges reflect the demographics of the American judiciary?
During the time span of the cases included in this set, 1994-2003, nationally 6.75
percent (N=4,045) of American judges were identified as racial or ethnic minorities. Of
this group, 1,798 are African American.51 Thus, African American judges are slightly
over-represented. Republican judges are also over- represented, which makes sense
considering that disputes over competitive admissions are more likely to arise in more
conservative states. As of the 2000 election, 52 percent of appointments from previous
administrations judges in the federal judiciary were Clinton or Carter appointees.
Forty-four percent (44%) were Reagan or Bush, Sr. appointees. The remaining judges
(2%) are from previous administrations.52 Women, on the other hand, are slightly
underrepresented, as approximately 20 percent of federal judges are women and only

51

Id.

52

Mark A. Hoffman, Next president to fill vacancies in judiciary. BUSINESS INSURANCE, Sept.
11, 2000, at 34.
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thirteen percent of judges in this sample are female.53 Nationally, 17.4 percent of U.S.
Court of Appeals Judges and 16.2 percent of U.S. District Court Judges are women.54

2. Data Analysis

Of the 40 judges in this analysis, two-thirds ruled against supporting race
conscious admissions in education, 25 out of 40. Considering that nearly forty percent
of the judges are Democratic-appointees, within this dataset overall there seems to be

Table 1 – The Number of Judicial
Rulings by Political Affiliation of the
Judge and the Presence of Social Science
Evidence at Trial
Plaintiff
Wins

Table 2 - Logit Estimates Defendant
Wins by Judicial Ruling

Party

Defendant
Wins

Gender

Republican
Data

6

1

No Data

14

2

Data

2

9

No Data

2

4

Data
Race

Democrat

53

ABA, COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION (2003).

54

Id.
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Model A Model B
2.75*
2.78*
(0.88)
(0.86)
1.35
1.43
(1.42)
(1.4)
0.23
(0.9)
-

Model C
2.94*
(0.85)
-

limited support for affirmative action. Yet, the party lines in the ruling outcomes are
fairly apparent. Republican appointees were stronger in their stance against affirmative
action, being five times as likely to rule in favor of student plaintiffs. Democratic
appointees were only three times as likely to rule in favor of defendant institutions.
Disaggregating judicial opinions by party affiliation and the presence of social
science evidence highlights the degree to which political affiliation dominates judicial
opinions in race conscious admissions cases. Regardless of the presence of social
science evidence, Republican-appointees ruling in favor of student plaintiffs represent
the outcomes of 50 percent of judicial opinions. Democratic-appointees ruling for
educational institutions account for 31.6 percent of judicial opinions
In only 18 percent of the opinions do Republican and Democratic appointees
(N=7) cross political affiliation lines, as shown in Table 1. This small degree of
philosophical deviance concurs with findings by Carp and Rowland that in the area of
racial discrimination, judges are more likely to rule along party lines.55 These findings
also concur with those of Francine Sanders Romero who finds that courts with a higher
percentage of “liberal” judges are more likely to rule in favor of minority interests, in
this case, pro affirmative action.56
Contained in Table 2 are results of the binomial logistic regression analysis
employed which reflect the aggregated relative influence of political affiliation, social
science evidence, and background factors in judicial opinions on race conscious

55

Carp and Rowland, supra note 45.

56

Romero, supra note 4 at 304.
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admissions cases.57

With respect to demographic factors, note that the race term drops

for reasons of collinearity as a Democratic president appointed each black judge in this
dataset.58 In addition, each of these judges (N=3) ruled in favor of affirmative action.
Among women judges, rulings were also along party lines, with the one Republicanappointed woman ruling for plaintiffs, the others (N=4), Democratic appointees, ruling
for defendants. Hence, the controlling factor for women, and perhaps for AfricanAmerican judges as well seems to be political affiliation. While the number of
observations (N=40) is small, there are enough independent opinions from which one
trend in particular can be exacted.59 When all the factors but political affiliation are

57

The models in Table 2 are derived from binomial logistic regression analysis, a statistical
technique designed to measure the relative association between a dependent variable (in this case judicial
ruling in favor of defendant educational institutions) with a categorical distribution (win/ not win) and
one or more independent variables (here the political affiliation, race, and gender of judges, the presence
of social science data. Logit analysis is appropriate for this type of inquiry as the outcome variable used
in this analysis is dichotomous. Logit estimations of the maximum likelihood of an event’s probability
correct for the non-linearity, non-normal distribution of errors, and heteroscedasticity generated by
general regression models using categorical outcome measures. See, ELAZAR J. PEDHAZUR, MULTIPLE
REGRESSION IN BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH (3d ed. 1997).
58

As such, the estimates of political philosophy, data, data quality and quantity as presented in
Table 2 are calculated without the race term.
59

This is a small dataset. However, note that in each of these models only one factor has a
statistically significant charge, meaning that the probability of this one factor, political affiliation, being
influential in judicial opinion-making in these cases is greater than 95 percent. The magnitude of this
factor changes little, even when all of the other factors are taken away. Forty observations are more than
sufficient to establish a pattern between two variables.
One may also be concerned about the three layers of variable clustering. First, judges at the
district and circuit court level are analyzing the same set of facts. Second, judges at the circuit court level
are analyzing the same set of facts in consultation with each other. Third, researchers testified at multiple
trials. Given the ambiguity of Fourteenth Amendment law at this juncture, judges are relatively free to
interpret the law according to their own predispositions. However, judges reviewing cases at different
levels, district and appellate, are constrained by the same set of facts. Upper level courts are usually
bound to findings of fact from courts below as the trial court has the advantage of actually hearing
testimony and watching the disposition of witnesses. But upper level courts are never bound to findings
of law from the court below and in these cases the essence of the dispute is not the facts, but the law. As
such, there is more, albeit imperfect, independence of observations in these cases than in other judicial
contexts, such as employment discrimination law where cases are handled in a relatively uniform fashion
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taken away, the relative weight of political affiliation changes very little and the
predictive power of the model remains the same: The percentage correctly predicted is
81.6% overall, 80% of defense wins, and 82.6% of wins by student plaintiffs.
Social science evidence, however, seems influential in only about 8 percent
(N=3) of cases (See Table 1).

By influential, I mean that there is an inverse

relationship between the judge’s philosophical predisposition and his or her decision.60
In this dataset, only one Republican-appointee ruled in favor of defendants when social
science data was employed. Judge Patrick J. Duggan who, ruling in the Gratz district
court decision, emphatically asserted that “based upon the record before it, that a
racially and ethnically diverse student body produces significant educational benefits
such that diversity, in the context of higher education constitutes a compelling
governmental interest.”61 Slightly more prevalent (N=2) were Democratic-appointees
who ruled against defendant educational institutions when social science evidence was
absent.

When these two Democratic-appointees ruling for student plaintiffs are

factored in with Republican-appointees, they create a majority of judges most
comfortable ruling against affirmative action in an effort to protect White interests.
As hypothesized, political affiliation is a greater predictor of judicial rulings
than social science research, with the estimates of the former registering statistically

according to statutory mandates. I mediate clustering effects by computing the Huber-White standard
error, which captures the relationship among errors in groups of observations, and compared results with
and without clustering controls. There is no difference in the relative weight of party affiliation.
60
61

Segal and Spaeth, supra note 4.
Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 824.
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significant and the latter not. Thus, the odds of a defendant win are more dependent on
the political affiliation of the judge,62 than on the presence of social science research.63
This set of findings supports the CLS notion that judicial decision-making is political.
Yet the politics here go beyond differences in philosophical understandings of the
democratic enterprise. At center are the politics of race and racism in the United States.

Part III – Perceived Interests and Interest Divergence: Judicial Opinions in Race
Conscious Admissions

The affirmative action in admissions debate, when framed as a zero-sum game,
pits Whites and certain classes of Asian students against Black and other students of
color.64 In practical terms, while affirmative action allows for people of color to
compete for scarce resources Whites cherish, such as seats in elite colleges and
universities, it does little in the aggregate to harm whites.65 With the dominant
perception of affirmative action, however, it is in the perceived interest of whites to

62

E.g., Model A: ORParty = 15.41.

63

E.g., Model A: ORData= 1.25.

64

See Girardeau A. Spann, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES
(1993); Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971
(1990); and, K.G. Jan Pillai, Neutrality of the Equal Protection Clause, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 89
(1999) (arguing that whites and males are the beneficiaries of constitutional pushes for neutrality). The
actual harm to students of color is grave as evident in the composition of elite universities in the
aftermath banning of affirmative action in the states of Washington, California, and Texas. See, e.g.,
Andrea Guerrero, THE SILENCE AT BOALT HALL, 2002. See also Gary Orfield and Edward Miller,
CHILLING ADMISSIONS: THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CRISIS AND THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES (1998).
IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA,

65

Note that eliminating the “racial plus” in competitive admissions at elite universities only
increases the likelihood of admissions of Whites from 25 to 26.5 percent, while seriously injuring the
probability of admissions for students of color. See William Bowen and Derek A. Bok, THE SHAPE OF
THE RIVER (1998).
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oppose affirmative action. Hence, perceived interests between whites and non-whites
diverge around affirmative action, as in the aggregate Whites are not willing to pay the
price for true equity and racial justice.66
With respect to perceived interests, the CRT frame of interest convergence
posits that gains for people of color are made only when and to the extent there are
gains for Whites.67 A corollary of interest convergence is the price of racial remedies
frame. According to Derrick Bell
the fourteenth amendment, standing alone, will not
authorize a judicial remedy providing effective racial
equality for black where the remedy sought threatens the
superior societal status of middle and upper class
whites.68
As framed as a competition for resources then, Whites are not willing to internalize the
cost of the risk of not being admitted to elite institutions. While this perception is
fallacious as the competition for seats at elite institutions is competitive within and
without racial groups, this perception is dominant in contemporary American (U.S.)
discourse.69

66

See Bell, Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 3 CALIFORNIA
LAW REVIEW, 76 (1979); Note that there is actual interest convergence in the cause of race conscious
admissions. All students benefit from racially diverse student bodies. These benefits, while not evenly
distributed, span academic, civic, and social in nature. The educational benefits of diversity are
presented in Patricia Gurin, et. al., DEFENDING DIVERSITY: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
MICHIGAN (2004).
67

See id; Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,
93 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, 518 (1980); Bell, supra note 2; and, Derrick A. Bell, RACE, RACISM, AND
AMERICAN LAW, 2nd Ed. (1992). See also Girardeau A. Spann, Color Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 1422,1425 (1995)(“From Dred Scott to Plessy to Brown, the primary concern of the Court in race
cases has been the protection of minority interests [citations omitted].”).
68

Bell, supra note 67 at 523.

69

See Bowen and Bok, supra note 65.
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At a basic level one cannot ignore that the reason for the inception of
affirmative action is the historic denial of civic equality to women and people of color.
For people of color, in particular, it was not until 1964, 96 years after the 1868
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of “equal protection of the laws”
that a statutory framework of civil rights was erected to protect the negative right of
freedom from discrimination in education and employment.70 However, even the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 could not undo the damage of centuries of inequality.71
Towards ameliorative ends, President Lyndon B. Johnson promulgated
Executive Order 11246 recognizing legally theoretical equality was not enough, “but as
a fact and as a result.”72 In the field of education, affirmative acts included not only the
employment of mechanisms to increase the presence of people of color in higher
education, but plans at the K-12 level, most notably busing and magnet programs, to
create better educational opportunities for all students.
In some respects, Executive Order 11246 represents the height of liberal support
for social equity, a rather low high point considering the absence of endorsement from
two houses of Congress. Within the same speech supporting affirmative action,
touting a quest for “not just legal equity but human ability,” sociologist Steven
Steinberg highlights that it was with “Machiavellian genius” that the administration

70

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000a et seq.

71

See Melvin I. Urofsy, The Supreme Court and Civil Rights since 1940: Opportunities and
Limitations, 4 BARRY L. REV. 39 (2003).
72

Graduation address to Howard University, reprinted in Lee Rainwater and William L.
Yancey, THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY: A TRANS-ACTION OF SOCIAL
SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY REPORT, 125-132, (1967; 2003).
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shifted the discourse away from, the radical vision of
“equal results” that emanated from the black protest
movement of the 1960s back to the standard liberal cant of
the 1950s… The conceptual groundwork was being laid for
a drastic policy reversal: The focus would no longer be on
white racism, but rather on the deficiencies of blacks
themselves.73
Thus, as Steinberg notes, from its inception support for the remediation of past
discrimination through affirmative action was limited. Using statistics Romero depicts
Steinberg’s contentions as she finds that the Supreme Court in particular is less likely to
support remedies for “de facto” conditions, but tends to be more vigilant when
discrimination can be traced to a particular governmental actor.74
With time and the entrenchment of the Reagan revolution, support for
affirmative action within the political regime and the polis waned. Not only is are the
courts packed with Reagan and Reagan protégé appointees, according to the public
opinion model of adjudication, judicial attitudes mirror the opinions of the general
American (U.S.) public by a lag of 2 to 7 years.75 In all probability the average judge, a
White male of privilege, does not support affirmative action, as he is not willing to pay
its perceived cost.76

73
The Liberal Retreat from Race During the Post-Civil Rights Era, 21 (Wahneema Lubiano Ed.,
THE HOUSE THAT RACE BUILT, 1997).
74

Romero, supra note 4 at 204.

75

See, e.g., Michael W. Link, Tracking Public Mood in the Supreme Court: Cross-time
Analyses of Criminal Procedure and Civil Rights Cases. 48 POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY 61
(1993); William Mishler and Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Model, and Supreme
Court Decision Making: A Micro-analytic Prospective. 58 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, 169 (1996); and
Segal and Spaeth, supra note 4.
76

A Los Angeles Times poll appraising the public’s view of President Bush’s stance against the
University of Michigan policies announced that of the 1,385 persons sampled, 55 percent were in favor.
See Davis G. Savage, Bush's Opposition to Racial Preferences Gets Big Support, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6,
2003, at 16. These figures compare well with Gallup Poll surveys in 1996 in which 61 percent of
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Looking at the data in Part II, overall judges are more likely to rule against
affirmative action and in favor of student plaintiffs. While it is generally expected that
Republicans would do so, what is most interesting is the degree to which Republicanappointees are stronger in their support of student plaintiffs (five times as likely to rule
for plaintiffs) than Democratic-appointees are of defendant institutions (three times as
likely to rule for defendants. Thus, while Democratic-appointees are not necessarily
against affirmative action, they are not strongly in favor of it.
Therein lay the dilemma of people of color as suits challenging affirmative
action are pursued. Whites bring these suits usually against institutions. No party
involved represents the interest of people of color. Intervention of right is not
guaranteed and is often fought for and lost.77 What the present research adds is that in
the context of race conscious admissions judges, whether Republican or Democratic
appointees, are not likely to stand up in the Hamiltonian tradition of the defense of
minority rights. Hope for the continuance of affirmative action lays at the hearts of
cowardly lions, those judges one would expect to uphold minority interests but fail to

respondents supported a national policy modeled on California’s Proposition 209, which prohibits
affirmative action in public employment, education, and contracting. See G. Gallup, THE GALLUP POLL:
PUBLIC OPINION 1997(1997). More systematically, political scientists Kinder and Winter use the 1992
National Election Study and estimate the black-white divide at 36 percent on issues of equal employment
opportunity, 43 percent with respect to hiring preferences, and 52 percent for college quotas. Although
their simulation models suggest some convergence in the divide when accounting for social class, the
most significant variation is related to philosophical differences. In principle, blacks prize equal
opportunity, while whites value limited government. Blacks express within group solidarity, while
whites express racial resentment, which becomes more pronounced during competition for resources.
Thus, although higher education levels are associated with more liberal positions on questions of race,
this liberality is tempered for Whites, as income is directly related to conservatism and as resource
competition intensifies. The results of the polls in combination with political science research suggest
that with respect to affirmative action the “middle” is under siege. In this vein, the average elite
European American (U.S.), including judges, is not likely to support affirmative action. See Donald R.
Kinder and Nicholas Winter, Exploring the Racial Divide: Blacks, Whites, and Opinion on National
Policy. 45 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 439 (2001).
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do so. Instead they hide behind formalism losing sight of the values of equality of
opportunity formalism at its core is said to embrace.

Part IV - When Hope Lies with the Courage of a Cowardly Lion: Affirmative Action
Now and in 25 Years
If it is the case that the perceived interest of Whites diverges from people of
color with respect to affirmative action, then how is the result in Grutter explained?
After all, at the time the Supreme Court’s opinion in Grutter was rendered, seven of the
nine justices on the Court were Republican-appointees. To answer, the cowardly lion
metaphor is useful.
As one may recall in the Wizard of Oz the Cowardly Lion is the character who
seeks courage and just like the other characters seeking gifts from the Wizard he too is
already so equipped, in his case to be courageous. When Lion finally meets the
Wizard, the Wizard shows Lion that he can be courageous and was the hero Dorothy
needed when she needed him most.
Just like the Cowardly Lion the Supreme Court spent the 25 years from Bakke
to Grutter wringing their hands in cowardice trying to figure out what to do about
affirmative action. On the one hand, the Court cannot deny the force of history or
present day disparities. On the other, the Court is not willing to forsake White
privileges for equity’s sake. Hence we have the wringing of hands: whether states and
localities can affirmatively act or only the federal government,78 what is the appropriate
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Spann, supra note 67.
See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) cf. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989).(invalidating an affirmative action program in government contracts based upon the
78
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standard of review,79 for what level of government,80 and what is the evidentiary burden
for governmental institutions? 81 The tensions masked in these questions are no more
apparent in the Court as a whole as in the jurisprudence of Justice O’Connor.
While O’Connor appointment was part of the Reagan revolution and the rise of
conservatism in government, as a female student at Stanford Law during the 1940s, she

program upheld for the federal government in Fullilove). Here the Court was particularly concerned
about the possibility of racial spoils in a city with a sizable Black population. As such the compelling
interest was suspect. Perhaps this argument would have grounding if it were the case that raw political
power attained by blacks could operate a city, without financial support from predominantly white gentry
and white-owned-businesses. For this reason, even majority minority localities are more often than not
beholden to Whites for financial support and assurances of re-election. See Paul E. Peterson, City Limits
(1981). Even if it were the case that the black political elites of Richmond were engaging in “spoilage,”
would not that “spoilage” be justified given Richmond’s long history of segregation and discrimination?
The lingering effects of that past were apparent in the case as only 0.67% of contracts for the city
actually went to firms owned by people of color. Croson, 488 U.S. at 479.
Additionally the policy was found to be overly broad, including Aleuts and Alaskans who
historically had not been discriminated against by the City of Richmond. See id. at 506. Note that the
program in Fullilove included Aleuts as well, although no significant numbers resided in the City of
Jacksonville where the program was challenged.
79

See University of California Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) and Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education 476 U.S. 267 (1986)(where severely fractured majorities rejected
affirmative action policies. While in the former five Justices could agree to the one standard of strict
scrutiny, in the latter consensus was not found). Cf. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989)(where a majority held strict scrutiny to be the standard of review in all racial classifications at the
level of states and localities), Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (where a majority
declared intermediate scrutiny appropriate for “benign” racial classifications proffered by the federal
government)and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (reversing Metro
Broadcasting, declaring strict scrutiny the appropriate standard of review for all racial classifications).
80

See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) cf. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
81

See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) cf. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989) (requiring a more rigorous evidentiary burden on the City in both statistical and
geographic specificity). See also University of California Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978) (Opinion, Powell, J.) (supporting the educational benefits of diversity rationale with citation in
footnote to an editorial of then Princeton President William Bowen) cf. social science evidence amassed
in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). Even though
the Supreme Court deferred to the data in the Michigan cases, that data was necessary ground the
Supreme Court’s decision. See further Wooden v. Board of Regents of the University of Georgia, 32
F.Supp. 2d 1370, 1380 (GA 1999) (Opinion, Edenfield, J.) (“[a]lthough the court recognizes the
theoretical benefits of an educational setting which is open to a diverse collection of viewpoints, it is not
convinced that these benefits – furthered here only in an abstract sense – justify outright discriminatory
admission practices which cause concrete constitutional injuries”).
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understood from personal experience what it means to be in the minority. She also
understood that she was an affirmative action beneficiary.82 In parallel contradiction to
her life, O’Connor consistently enunciated the stringency of the strict scrutiny standard
in her equal protection jurisprudence and striking affirmative action cases in the race
context, while asserting that strict scrutiny was not “fatal in fact.”83 Education was one
area O’Connor seemed to be more aware of the consequences of limiting the
opportunities of students of color. In concurrence, O’Connor in Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education 84 holds out hope that there may be an affirmative action policy
capable of meeting strict scrutiny’s standard, stating
although its precise contours are uncertain, a state interest
in the promotion of racial diversity has been found
sufficiently ‘compelling,’ at least in the context of higher
education, to support the use of racial considerations in
furthering that interest.85
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See Joan Biskupic, SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN ON THE SUPREME
COURT BECAME ITS MOST INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE (2005).
83

Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237. O’Connor specifically states her desire to dispel the
characterization of strict scrutiny as strict in theory, but fatal in fact. However, in the one case she cites
for this proposition, United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987), she along with Justices Rhenquist
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While on the one hand O’Connor suggests a desire to hold open a hope for
equity; she always found technical reasons to nullify affirmative action policies brought
before the Court. For example, in Wygant and Metro Broadcasting, and Croson
O’Connor does acknowledge that discrimination exists, but spends a considerable
amount of time highlighting deficiencies in the data brought before the Court. Her
criticism revolves around the potential skews in the statistical depiction of
discrimination and need for present remediation. While detail orientation is important,
if one is desiring “to create a society untouched by that history of exclusion, and to
ensure … equality,”86 then why is the address of general societal discrimination taboo?
The concern that the programs may be too broad, remedying general societal
discrimination, is a red herring. By particularizing the harm as emanating from a
singular defendant governmental agency creates a policy environment wherein
affirmative action is difficult to pursue and costly to defend.87 The weight of the policy
climate is then towards a status quo of inequity. As such O’Connor’s attention to detail
in equal protection cases seems to hide her true concerns of upsetting the racial balance
of power to the disadvantage of the White and privileged.88
O’Connor’s decision in Adarand embraces this status quo largely resting on the
concepts of stare decisis and consistency. She speaks not of equity or justice for the
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“disadvantaged” minorities for whom the federal affirmative action in contracting
program was created. Nor is there discussion of the “advantaged,” those who by way
of white and economic privilege are better able to compete for government contracts.
The consideration of justice and equity is void, with the technical particularities of the
strict scrutiny formula reified.
Why then deference to data in the Michigan cases? Perhaps akin to a deathbed
confession O’Connor poises herself to retire from the Court with specific knowledge
that she is not the one who closed the door on equality. Like the Cowardly Lion in the
Wizard of Oz, she stepped up in favor of affirmative action when all but hope was gone.
In a fantasy world format echoing from her dissent in Metro Broadcasting,89
O’Connor in Grutter expresses a an aspiration for affirmative action’s end:
We take the Law School at its word that it would "like
nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions
formula" and will terminate its race-conscious admissions
program as soon as practicable. [citations omitted]. It has
been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of
race to further an interest in student body diversity in the
context of public higher education … We expect that 25
years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer
be necessary to further the interest approved today.90
Seemingly, resting where the majority opinion in Grutter ends may be an uneasy place
for O’Connor. A state of the world wherein all people are created equal and treated
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equitably is easier for her to deal with: the Court can get on with the form of equality
without attending to its substance.
Not too long after the University of Michigan declared victory in the law school
case of Grutter v. Bollinger, investigations began against three universities in the fourth
circuit, deemed the most conservative circuit in the United States.91 While it will take a
while for these cases to percolate through the system, and it is unlikely that the
Supreme Court will take up another race conscious admissions case until compelled by
circuit splits, patterns in the lower courts and the recent appointments of Justices Alito
and Roberts point towards O’Connor’s aspiration begin achievable. However, in 25
years will the end of affirmative action be accompanied by equity? Probably not as the
mutual grounding of the diversity interest as presented in Grutter laid in deferential
cowardice.
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